Milkovich Meets Modern Federalism in Libel Law: The Lost Opinion Privilege Gives Birth to Enhanced State Constitutional Protection by Bowman, Nancy K.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 2 Winter 1992 Article 3 
Milkovich Meets Modern Federalism in Libel Law: The Lost 
Opinion Privilege Gives Birth to Enhanced State Constitutional 
Protection 
Nancy K. Bowman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Nancy K. Bowman, Milkovich Meets Modern Federalism in Libel Law: The Lost Opinion Privilege Gives 
Birth to Enhanced State Constitutional Protection, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 583 (1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol42/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
MILKOVICH MEETS MODERN FEDERALISM IN LIBEL
LAW: THE LOST OPINION PRIVILEGE GIVES BIRTH TO
ENHANCED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
Nancy K. Bowman*
Like a will-o'-the-wisp, the absolute privilege for opinion was cre-
ated out of nothing and has vanished from federal constitutional law
with a stroke of the judicial pen. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.,' the Supreme Court of the United States decided that this
lower court-created privilege never existed and was not needed to
protect media defendants from defamation claims.'
The media immediately recoiled in alarm. Did this mean more
libel trials, more constraints on freedom of the press, a chill wind
blasting through newsrooms across the nation? The media said yes.
Some legal experts agreed, yet others believed, as the Supreme
Court did, that the First Amendment and state common law already
provided opinion with all the protection it needed.' However, the
Court left open the possibility of enhanced state constitutional pro-
tection for opinion.4 A post-Milkovich case confirmed the viability
of this method of state constitutional protection when the Court de-
nied certiorari in June of 1991 to Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankow-
ski.5 This case allowed the use of a separate state constitutional
* Assistant Professor of Journalism, University of Missouri - Columbia School of Journalism.
B.A., University of Delaware; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1989. I would like to thank my re-
search assistants, Nancy Waters, Lisa Kremer, and Hongmin Qi for their help with this Article.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
2. Id. at 2705.
3. See, e.g., Mark Eissman, A Matter of Opinion, NEwslNc., Feb. 1991, at 30 (reporting the
media's reaction to Milkovich and suggesting that the decision's effect could be limited); Robert
S. Warren & Rex S. Heinke, Not As Bad As It Looks, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1990, at 13 (arguing
that the Milkovich decision does not diminish First Amendment protection of speech). But see
Lewis R. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for "Opinion" Found Defamatory, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27 (assessing the lack of protection for opinion); Gail D. Cox, Lawyer Wins
$1.6 Million Libel Award, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 13 (reporting the reaction of the legal
community to the use of the Milkovich doctrine in O'Connor v. McGraw-Hill); David A. Schulz,
Aftermath of the Milkovich Case: Pure Opinion Still Protected, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 2,
1991, at 20 (stating that pure opinion remains protected). •
4. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702 n.5.
5. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991). Although remanded after
Milkovich, the New York Court of Appeals approved the use of the state constitution to give
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ground to protect opinion to a greater extent than might be possible
using the First Amendment and state common law, as Milkovich
recommended. Because there was no federal question presented, Im-
muno, a state supreme court opinion, avoided United States Su-
preme Court review.'
The absolute privilege for opinion was based on the lower courts'
generally accepted interpretation of Justice Powell's 1974 dictum in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,7 in which he stated, "Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." 8 This dictum
was unrelated to the Gertz holding regarding private figures and
their burden of proof for damages in defamation cases. However,
these words were used subsequently by many state and federal
courts to create a First Amendment-based absolute privilege for
opinion, which protected almost any statements labeled opinion
from defamation claims.' This protection was systematized in 1984
by the widely accepted four-factor opinion analysis set forth in
Ollman v. Evans,10 a United States Court of Appeals case for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Two of the four factors involved con-
text: where the article was placed within the publication and what
kind of article it was." One question raised by Milkovich was
whether the context analysis was dead, or whether it was still ac-
ceptable as the basis for analysis under other state and federal opin-
ion protections. Rumors of its death were apparently premature. x2
What Milkovich clearly held was that a label indicating that
challenged statements are opinion is not enough to protect the state-
greater protection to opinion. The method thus remains viable as a way to protect opinion, reduce
self-censorship, and decrease libel trials as a result of the Milkovich decision.
6. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). "Respect for the independence of
state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of
this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground." Id.
at 1040. "'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting
their state constitutions.'" Id. at 1041 (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
557 (1940)).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id. at 339.
9. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A] majority of
federal circuit courts, including this one, have accepted the [dictum] as controlling law."), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1127 (1985).
10. Id. at 979-84.
II. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (discussing the four-part Oilman test).
12. Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power
of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 784-87 (1990) (encouraging the use of context analysis in
fact/opinion libel cases "[b]ecause context shapes the meaning of individual words and sentences,
it also influences their degree of precision or ambiguity").
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ments as opinion. The Supreme Court said that an article calling
the plaintiff a "liar" while testifying under oath at a judicial pro-
ceeding implied defamatory facts.' s The Court held that the core
issue in the case was "whether or not a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the statements imply an assertion" of fact that could
be objectively proved true or false. 14
Milkovich stripped away the protective shield of the absolute
opinion privilege and exposed published statements to a libel action
if provable defamatory facts could be implied from the "opinion."' 5
As a result, more cases now could go to trial because the Supreme
Court now said what was once protected opinion may imply defama-
tory facts.' 6 The lower courts today, however, have shown a shrewd
adaptability in the face of the lost privilege. They have either taken
the Supreme Court's cue and used the shopping list of state and
federal media libel defenses enumerated in Milkovich,17 or they
have sidestepped federal review by basing their decisions on inde-
pendent state grounds, utilizing state constitutional protections of
speech and the press that go beyond federal constitutional
protections.' 8
Unelko Corp. v. Rooney,'9 a Ninth Circuit case decided two
months after Milkovich, took the simpler route; the court used a
federal constitutional defense from the Milkovich list to affirm for
the defendants.20 The defense was based on the First Amendment
requirement that the plaintiff have the burden of proving the falsity
of the challenged factual statements when there is a media defend-
ant. The Immuno court also used this defense where some state-
ments in question were admitted to be factual.2' Since the
13. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
14. Id. at 2705-08.
15. Id. at 2706; see Nat Stern, Defamation, Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruc-
tion) of the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REv. 595, 623 (1990) (concluding that the Court's
reasoning in Milkovich "gives impetus to an increase rather than diminution in successful suits by
objects of criticism").
16. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
17. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990) (using the defense in
which the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity when there is a media defendant and
an issue of public concern to affirm for the defendant), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 1586 (1991); see
also Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (enumerating the defenses discussed in the case).
18. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.
2261 (1991).
19. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 1586 (1991).
20. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Milkovich case).
21. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1275-77.
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Milkovich decision, the plaintiff's burden to prove falsity has been
the most frequently used defense for libelous factual statements. 2
Many post-Milkovich courts have used context analyses relating
to First Amendment protections, indicating that Milkovich has not
been interpreted as discarding context as a factor in distinguishing
between fact and opinion.2 3 The main problem with the Milkovich
decision is that it does not explain how to distinguish between fact
and opinion, leaving courts with the same subjective choices on this
matter of law as they had before the decision.24 That lack of subjec-
tivity is perhaps why the lower courts had so enthusiastically em-
braced the absolute opinion privilege. 5 It was the closest thing to a
bright-line rule for opinion analysis. Instead, the media now face the
possibility of more self-censorship. They must be more careful when
they publish opinion, wondering always if a court will say the opin-
ion implied facts. 6
The purpose of this Article is to examine Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., analyze its possible effects on the media, and examine
how state and federal courts have adapted to the new fact/opinion
analysis required by Milkovich. The Article then will suggest the
use of state constitutional defenses to give a higher protection to
opinion than that granted by the Federal Constitution after
Milkovich and to provide a way to avoid further United States Su-
preme Court review of the case. The use of these defenses is one
way to reduce self-censorship and to avoid more libel trials.
I. THE FACT/OPINION DISTINCTION PRE-MILKOVICH 27
The essence of the fact/opinion distinction in defamation claims
22. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct.
1586 (1991); Flip Side, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 564 N.E.2d 1244 (I1. App. Ct. 1990).
23. See infra notes 220-32 and accompanying text (outlining the use of context analysis in
South Dakota, California, and Illinois); see also Stern, supra note 15, at 614-15.
24. See Jerry J. Phillips, Opinion and Defamation: The Camel in the Tent, 57 TENN. L. REV.
647, 675 (1990) (concluding that the opinion rule is "unmanageable in scope and unpredictable in
application").
25. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (listing federal circuit
cases which used the absolute privilege for opinion as controlling law), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1127
(1985).
26. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219, 224 (1990)
[hereinafter Leading Cases]; T.R. Hager, Note, Recent Development: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.: Lost Breathing Space - Supreme Court Stifles Freedom of Expression by Eliminating First
Amendment Opinion Privilege, 65 TULANE L. REV. 944, 951-52 (1991).
27. See generally George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1977) (criticizing the Restatement's "inflexible approach");
[Vol. 42:583
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is that an opinion based on true statements cannot be proved objec-
tively to be true or false.2 8 Rather, it is the subjective creation of the
writer's thought processes after analyzing factual statements on
which the opinion is based. For example, consider the statement "I
love Cajun food because it's so spicy." In that statement, it is not
possible to objectively judge whether or not the speaker "loves" Ca-
jun food; thus, the statement is an opinion.
A factual statement, however, can be proved true or false by ex-
amining objective evidence on which the statement is based. 9 It is
important to note that what appears to be an opinion actually can
be a factual statement.8 0 For example, prefacing the factual state-
ment "Jones is a liar" with the words "in my opinion" will not re-
move the need for evidence proving that Jones is indeed a liar.
A. The Law of Defamation
Defamation includes the two torts of libel and slander. Libel in-
volves written or other published materials such as cartoons and
photographs.31 Slander involves reputation-damaging words spoken
about one person to a third party. 2 These laws were historically the
Timothy Gleason, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in Libel, 10 COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763 (1988) (ad-
vocating contextual categories of protected forums for opinion); Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel,
Language, and Law: New York Time [sic] v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 NC. L. REV. 273
(1990) (analyzing defamation law since Sullivan and suggesting a unitary system of practice,
damages, and fault); Gordon Shneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First
Amendment Protected "Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57 (1990) (developing a model of analysis for
the fact/opinion distinction); Eileen Finan, Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in Defama-
tion, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1988) (advocating principles of strict construction for defamation
cases on matters of public concern); Seth A. Kaplan, Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 81 (1981) (regarding the
American Law Institute's position as untenable and looking for Supreme Court guidance); Loren
W. Moll, Note, Defamation - Actionable Statement of Fact Versus Privileged Opinion: Olman
v. Evans, 34 KAN. L. REV. 367 (1985) (suggesting the resuscitation of the fair comment doctrine);
Michaele Sanders, Comment, The Fact/Opinion Distinction: An Analysis of the Subjectivity of
Language and Law, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 673 (1987) (refuting the absence of a bright-line rule);
Robert N. Webner, Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The
Need for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEo. L.J. 1817 (1984) (arguing that the courts should develop a
bright-line test).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977).
29. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
30. Cianci v. New York Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). "It would be destructive
of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of crime simply by using,
explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think.'" Id. at 64.
31. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915-16 (6th ed. 1990).
32. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §§ 111, 112 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984) (defining
defamation, libel, and slander); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining defam-
atory communication).
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province of the states and included both statutory and common law
as they evolved in court opinions."3 Liability for libel usually re-
quires four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement about
another; (2) an unprivileged publication of the statement to a third
party; (3) some level of defendant fault; and (4) the presence of
harm to the plaintiff caused by the publisher's statement.34
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, " first entered the libel arena by providing a First
Amendment-based defense for libelous statements made by the me-
dia about public officials, giving rise to the New York Times "actual
malice" defense or privilege.36 Since that time, the Court has fur-
ther infringed on state libel law by providing other constitutional
defenses for the media.3 7
State common law itself has amended its rules, which had origi-
nally required only that the plaintiff allege an "unprivileged publi-
cation of false and defamatory matter to state a cause of action for
defamation. '3'  This had to be changed because under state libel
laws, opinions as well as factual assertions could be defamatory. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that opinion in the past could
be defamatory if:
the expression was sufficiently derogatory of another as to cause harm to his
reputation. .... The expression of opinion was also actionable in a suit for
defamation, despite the normal requirement that the communication be
false as well as defamatory. . . .This position was maintained even though
the truth or falsity of an opinion - as distinguished from a statement of
fact - is not a matter that can be objectively determined and truth is a
complete defense to a suit for defamation.3 9
The remedy for this anomaly in libel law was the "fair comment"
privilege. It allowed the writer to express opinions on issues of pub-
lic interest based on factual statements if there was no intent to
harm the subject.40
33. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. Id. at 279-80.
37. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (summarizing federal protections for media
defendants).
38. Id. at 2702.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977).
40. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03; see also Charles H. Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire
and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An Alternative to Actual Malice, 30 DEPAUL L. REV.
1 (1980) (advocating the expansion of the use of the fair comment doctrine); Herbert W. Titus,
Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15
[Vol. 42:583
FEDERALISM AND LIBEL
B. Enter Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc." ' There, the Court held that a media defendant publishing de-
famatory falsehoods about a private person regarding a public issue
could not use the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan42 actual malice
defense. That defense, requiring proof of reckless disregard for the
truth or knowledge of falsity of the challenged statements, 43 could
be used only when the plaintiff was a public official or public figure.
The Gertz Court instead required a lower standard of proof of fault
when a private plaintiff is involved, but held that no liability without
fault could be imposed." An award of punitive damages, however,
required the actual malice standard of proof in these circumstances,
while an award of compensatory damages required only the state
law standard, which is usually some level of negligence. 45
It is clear from Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz that the fact/
opinion distinction was not an issue in the holding. Subsequently,
however, lower courts at both the federal and state levels found
something in the opinion that struck a responsive chord. It was Jus-
tice Powell's "no false idea" dictum:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.
46
However, Justice Powell did not expand on the untouchability of
opinion. Rather, he discussed in depth the lack of value in false
statements of fact and the opposing need for avoiding media self-
censorship caused by fear that the innocent printing of a false state-
VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962) (proposing new standards and methods of analysis for the defense of
fair comment).
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see, e.g., James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777
(1975) (assessing the Supreme Court's view of libel and finding a retreat from First Amendment
protection).
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official may be awarded damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct only if the official proves actual malice).
43. Id. at 279-80; see also W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIvE YEARS AFTER
TIMES V. SULLIVAN (1989) (reviewing the actual malice standard).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
45. Id. at 346-50.
46. Id. at 339-40 (footnotes omitted).
19921
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ment will not be protected."'
Despite the irrelevance of the opinion analysis in Gertz, both state
and federal lower courts espoused the "no false idea" dictum with a
vengeance.4 8 It took on a life of its own, in the form of the now-
defunct absolute constitutional privilege for opinion. The Gertz dic-
tum has been cited in case after case, reaching its zenith of popular-
ity in Ollman v. Evans.49 Ollman, a 1984 United States Court of
Appeals case for the District of Columbia Circuit, systematized the
absolute opinion privilege analysis.
C. Olman v. Evans: The Opinion Privilege Analysis"0
Judge Starr's opinion for the court in Ollman v. Evans5 created a
four-factor analysis by which the court would determine whether
statements were absolutely protected opinion or unprotected factual
assertions.52 In this case, the plaintiff, Bertel Oliman, a professor of
political science at New York University, claimed that a newspaper
column by the defendants, syndicated columnists Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak, defamed his professional reputation, causing
him to lose the opportunity to head the Department of Government
and Politics at the University of Maryland. 3 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the column was pro-
tected opinion via the Gertz dictum.54 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed. 55
Judge Starr began his analysis with a less than convincing ration-
ale for the use of the Gertz dictum to validate the court's use of the
absolute opinion privilege:
In Gertz, the Supreme Court in dicta seemed to provide absolute immunity
from defamation actions for all opinions and to discern the basis for this
immunity in the First Amendment. .... By this statement, Gertz elevated to
47. Id. at 340-41.
48. See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1127 (1985).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Edward G. Heidig, Ollman v. Evans: Skinning the Membrane of Fact Versus
Opinion, 23 TORT & INs. L.J. 232 (1987).
51. 750 F.2d 970.
52. Id. at 979-84.
53. Id. at 971-73.
54. Olman v. Evans, 479 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1979), affid, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1127 (1985).
55. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 42:583
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constitutional principle the distinction between fact and opinion, which at
common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair comment.8 6
In a related footnote, the court admitted that the statement in
Gertz was clearly dictum but then grabbed its bootstraps. "Despite
its status as dicta, a majority of federal circuit courts, including this
one, have accepted the statement as controlling law."57 The footnote
then listed cases from various circuits in accord with the D.C.
Circuit 8
With this discussion as the preamble to the Ollman analysis,
Judge Starr listed the four factors used to analyze the "totality of
the circumstances in which statements are made to decide whether
they merit the absolute First Amendment protection enjoyed by
opinion."59 The four factors were:
1. Common usage or meaning of the specific language of the
statement - Is there a commonly understood meaning, or is the
statement indefinite and ambiguous?; 0
2. Verifiability - Can the statement be objectively characterized
as true or false? If not, would the reasonable reader understand it to
be opinion?; 61
3. Full context - The entire article or column should be consid-
ered. The surrounding language will influence the average reader's
inferences regarding specific statements;62
4. Broader context or setting - Is it on the editorial page, for
example? Some types of writing, by custom or convention, signal
readers that what is being read is opinion.6
The third and fourth factors rely on context analysis. The Olman
court relied on these two factors as determinative, despite its conclu-
sion that analysis of some of the statements using the first two fac-
tors, or fair comment, would make the statements actionable as
factual.6
The statement by Evans and Novak that the court found most
troubling was the one in which the defendants quoted an anonymous
56. Id. at 974-75 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 974 n.6.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 979.
60. Id. at 979-81.
61. Id. at 981-82.
62. Id. at 982-83.
63. Id. at 983-84.
64. Id. at 989-90.
1992]
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political science professor who said that Olman had "no status"
within his profession and was a pure and simple political activist.65
Judge Starr conceded that at least one pre-Gertz case has held that
the common law privilege of fair comment does not extend protec-
tion to remarks which disparage one's status among one's peers. 6
However, he stated that the appearance of the column on the Op-Ed
page (the broader context setting) would nevertheless influence the
average reader to conclude that the remark was an opinion.6 7 In-
deed, Judge Starr held that the charge of "no status" was "rhetori-
cal hyperbole" within the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision
in Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,8 where the Court em-
ployed the context analysis to find that "blackmail" was used as
hyperbole.69
In supporting the Olman court's preferential attitude toward the
two context factors, Judge Starr made the following statement:
But most fundamentally, we are reminded that in the accommodation of the
conflicting concerns reflected in the First Amendment and the law of defa-
mation, the deep-seated constitutional values embodied in the Bill of Rights
requires that we not engage, without bearing clearly in mind the context
before us, in a Talmudic parsing of a single sentence or two, as if we were
occupied with a philosophical enterprise or linguistic analysis.7 0
Is Ollman really a two-factor test relying solely on a contextual
analysis? It appears so. More importantly, did the Milkovich court
really ignore context? The Court did not ignore it in Bresler, in
which a charge of blackmail by irate citizens at a city council meet-
ing was accurately reported in a local newspaper. 7 1 The Supreme
Court placed the blackmail charge in the "rhetorical hyperbole"
and "vigorous epithet" category of protected opinion based on the
context in which statements were made during a heated debate.72
Likewise, in Milkovich the Court used the words "tenor and con-
text" in its analysis of the Gertz dictum and used the word "tenor"
when referring to the challenged Diadiun column. 73
65. Id. at 989.
66. Id. (citing Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964)).
67. Id. at 990.
68. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
69. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 989-91.
70. Id. at 991.
71. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6.
72. Id. at 14.
73. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705, 2707 (1990).
[Vol. 42:583
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It appears that the United States Supreme Court would disap-
prove of Ollman for its espousal of the absolute opinion privilege,
and not for its context analysis.74 It would, therefore, be possible to
transfer the Ollman test to other First Amendment analyses in fu-
ture cases. It would also seem reasonable to include context in any
fact/opinion analysis because it is based on the reader's reality.
Readers generally do not read a sentence without looking at the ar-
ticle as a whole. And it is obvious that articles and columns that
appear on an editorial page, for example, are more likely to be read
with caution as not necessarily stating only facts which the reader
should digest without question."
The same may apply to cautionary language attached to an arti-
cle or column. However, the words "I think" and "In my opinion"
are not sufficiently cautionary, as the Supreme Court in Milkovich
clearly stated, because it would be easy to follow them with factual
observations about an individual.7 6 The problem then arises: Isn't
the Op-Ed page or a letter-to-the-editor logo cautionary language
too? But this is what the Milkovich Court meant when it said an
opinion label is not enough to protect opinion.77 If so, the article's
internal context may be more valuable to the media defendant's ar-
gument than the article's location, which runs headlong into the "no
label" analysis. 8
The problem with the fact/opinion analysis generally is that it
has a circular quality,7 9 which may be what led the Supreme Court
in Milkovich to be more restrictive in its analysis parameters.80 Fur-
thermore, this may be why the lower courts were so enamored of the
74. Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 462 U.S. 1127
(1985).
76. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
77. Id.
78. But see Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
humorous or hyperbolic nature of Andy Rooney's broadcast segment did not preclude finding that
the challenged statement was factual), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1586 (1991).
79. A circular argument could go as follows: "Theft" is a crime provable as true or false, so to
call someone a thief is to state a fact, not an opinion. But if it were said during an angry outburst
to someone who "stole" the victim's wife, it would be termed loose or figurative language, or
rhetorical hyperbole, and therefore be protected by the First Amendment. Then again, who is to
say that the heated statement was not said quite seriously, as with Milkovich's "liar" charges?
80. "The dispositive question in the present case then becomes whether or not a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. We think the answer must be answered in the
affirmative." Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
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Gertz absolute opinion privilege. It saved them from tedious and
often subjective analyses of opinion. A bright-line rule would be
convenient. 81 The question remains: Would such a rule be fair to
both the media and the plaintiff - or just the easy way out?
Milkovich, in effect, says there is no easy way out; keep struggling.
II. MILKOVICH v. LORAIN JOURNAL Co.: THE NEW
FACT/OPINION ANALYSIS
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,82 the Supreme Court of the
United States in a 7-2 decision held that there is no need for a sepa-
rate and absolute privilege for opinion based on the First Amend-
ment. 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, stated that
safeguards already established in state common law and in federal
constitutional law would be sufficient to protect opinion. The Court
further held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that state-
ments that implied that the plaintiff has committed the crime of
perjury were sufficiently factual to be capable of being proved true
or false, permitting possible recovery for defamation.8 4 The Court
reversed the lower court's finding for the defendants and remanded
the case to the Ohio court.8 5
Plaintiff Milkovich's libel claim was based on newspaper colum-
nist J. Theodore Diadiun's 1974 sports page column about Maple
Heights (Ohio) High School teacher and wrestling coach, Michael
Milkovich, and H. Don Scott, superintendent of Maple Heights
Public Schools.88 Scott sued for libel in a separate case.87 While
Milkovich was the wrestling coach at Maple Heights, his team was
involved in an altercation at a home wrestling match with Mentor
High School, a rival local team.88
81. See Webner, supra note 27 (espousing that all opinion should be absolutely protected if it is
labeled as such for the reader's benefit). But see Shneider, supra note 27 (suggesting three tiers of
protection for opinion: (1) absolute First Amendment protection for opinion related to core values
such as the self-government process; (2) a conditional privilege for public issues of lesser impor-
tance such as opinion about a space probe to gain information about extraterrestrial life; and (3)
no First Amendment protection for cultural opinion comments such as book reviews, which would
use state fair comment and traditional defamation analysis).
82. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
83. Id. at 2707.
84. Id.; see also Nicole A. LaBarbera, Note, The Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implica-
tion, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 677, 703 (1990) (encouraging the use of defamation by implication).
85. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2708.
86. Id. at 2697-2700.
87. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
88. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
[Vol. 42:583
FEDERALISM. AND LIBEL
Milkovich and Scott testified at an investigatory hearing before
the Ohio High School Athletic Association. The team was placed on
probation, 'and Milkovich was censured for his behavior at the
match.89 Subsequently, several parents and wrestlers from Maple
Heights sought a restraining order in county court against the Ath-
letic Association's ruling."' Milkovich and Scott testified under oath
at this judicial proceeding."'
The day after the court's decision overturning the ruling on due
process grounds, defendant Lorain Journal Company's newspaper,
the News-Herald in Lake County, Ohio, published a column written
by Diadiun. The column, which sided with the opponent high
school's team, expressed Diadiun's outrage at the county court's
overruling of Maple Heights' probation and tournament ineligibil-
ity.92 The headline on the sports page column read, "Maple beat the
law with the 'big lie.' " Beneath this appeared the columnist's photo-
graph and the words "TD Says." The jump headline said, "Diadiun
says Maple told a lie."93 The column text stated that the lesson stu-
dents learned from this was:
If you get in a jam, lie your way out. . . .The teachers responsible were
mainly Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich, and former superintendent
of schools, H. Donald Scott. . . .Anyone who attended the meet ...
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."4
Columnist Diadiun said in his column that he attended both the
wrestling meet and the Athletic Association hearing, but he did not
say that he attended the court proceeding. 5
Milkovich sued in county court for libel based on the headline
text and nine passages in the column, including those quoted
above. 96 The plaintiff claimed the statements accused him of com-
mitting the crime of perjury at the court proceeding, an indictable
offense in Ohio, and damaged his reputation as a respected coach
and teacher.9"
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2699.
97. Id. at 2699-80.
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In the first round of the litigation, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, finding that the challenged state-
ments were protected opinion.98 The Ohio Court of Appeals af-
firmed.99 In 1984, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed in favor of
the plaintiff and remanded, holding that the column's statements
were unprotected factual assertions. i0 In 1986, while the case was
on remand, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its position in Super-
intendent Scott's separate libel suit against the same defendants. 1 1
The Scott court held that Diadiun's column was protected opinion
using the 1984 Ollman v. Evans four-factor opinion analysis. 102 The
Ohio Supreme Court held that although the article's statements ap-
peared to be factual under the first two factors, common usage and
verifiability, the column's internal context and broader setting on
the sports page indicated that the statements would most likely be
treated as opinion by the sports section readers. 10 3
In 1989, the Ohio Court of Appeals considered Milkovich a sec-
ond time on an appeal by the plaintiff and held that it was bound by
the Scott state supreme court decision in favor of the defendants. °4
The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Milkovich's subsequent ap-
peal.' 0 5 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari,'0 6 then in 1990 reversed for Milkovich and remanded the case
for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.' 0 7
III. THE MILKOVICH OPINION ANALYSIS
Although Michael Milkovich ultimately settled with the defend-
ants,10 8 the most important effect of his judicial odyssey remains the
United States Supreme Court's rejection of the absolute opinion
privilege and the changes that rejection brings to the fact/opinion
98. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 1199.
101. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
102. Id. at 706-09.
103. Id. at 706-07.
104. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
105. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2701 (1990).
106. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990).
107. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. at 2708.
108. The Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. case was settled when the plaintiff was paid "a tad
over $100,000" after sixteen years in the state and federal court systems. Mark Fitzgerald,
Milkovich "Libelous Opinion" Case Settled, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 20, 1991, at 10 (quoting
Lake County, Ohio News-Herald publisher Joseph A. Cocozzo).
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analysis. A label as an opinion column and placement on the sports
page, for example, are no longer enough to shield all statements as
opinion if a court finds that factual statements are implied.' 0 9
What the Court did for media defendants generally was to pro-
vide in one opinion a complete shopping list of traditional libel de-
fenses to show why there is no need for a separate First Amendment
privilege for opinion."' These protections range from the state com-
mon law fair comment privilege for opinion to various federal con-
stitutional protections beginning with the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan actual malice privilege."' Milkovich's flaw is its lack of
instructional detail on how to distinguish between opinion and fac-
tual assertions after selecting the appropriate defenses." 2
A. The State Common Law Defense
The Milkovich Court observed that opinion under original state
common law could not be proved to be false, but was capable of
being defamatory."' The Court added that this lack of protection
for opinion was later remedied so that state defamation laws could
not stifle public debate. 14 That remedy was the "fair comment"
privilege, a common law affirmative defense to a defamation ac-
tion." 5 The Court stated:
[C]omment was generally privileged when it concerned a matter of public
concern, was upon true or privileged facts, represented the actual opinion of
the speaker, and was not made solely for the purpose of causing harm. "Ac-
cording to the majority rule, the privilege of fair comment applied only to an
expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact, whether it was
expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion." Thus under the
common law, the privilege of "fair comment" was the device employed to
strike the appropriate balance between the need for vigorous public dis-
course and the need to redress injury wrought by invidious or irresponsible
speech. 1 6
109. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
110. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. See Leading Cases, supra note 26, at 224.
113. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
114. Id.
115, Id. at 2701-03.
116, Id. at 2703 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977)) (citations
omitted).
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B. State Constitutional Protections
The Supreme Court in Milkovich did not specifically name state
constitutional law as a further protective measure for opinion, but it
did allude to the possibility in a footnote.11 The footnote stated in
part that in Scott, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on both the Fed-
eral Constitution and the Ohio Constitution in its recognition of an
absolute opinion privilege. "Scott relied heavily on federal decisions
interpreting the scope of First Amendment protection accorded def-
amation defendants . . . Thus, the Scott decision was at least 'in-
terwoven with the federal law,' [and] was not clear on its face as to
the court's intent to rely on independent state grounds ....
The caveat here for media defendants is that if they do not estab-
lish clearly their "adequate" and "independent" state constitutional
grounds for protecting opinion, 119 they will lose the protection by
default if federal case law is also used as precedent.1
20
Thus, after Milkovich, there is no federal absolute opinion privi-
lege, but enhanced speech and press protections may be available
under state constitutions. 2 One interesting result when using dual
constitutional analyses is that when adequate and independent state
grounds are used by a state court deciding state law, the Supreme
Court will not review the case under Michigan v. Long. 22 This
117. Id. at 2702 n.5.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent "Adequate and Independent
State Grounds," 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371, 388-89 (1991) (advocating the use of adequate
and independent state grounds to protect opinion, but worrying that they will not be honored
because the state and federal court systems "are ideologically out of line and the United States
Supreme Court is activist"). But see Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.)
(challenging the New York court's use of its state constitution to enhance protection of opinion in
libel cases over that given by the First Amendment), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
120. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
[W]hen . . .a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the fact of the opinion, we will accept
as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41.
121. The Court in Milkovich remarked:
[Riespondents concede that the Scott court relied on both the United States Constitu-
tion as well as the Ohio Constitution in its recognition of an opinion privilege ....
Under Long, then, federal review is not barred in this case. We note that the Ohio
Supreme Court remains free, of course, to address all of the foregoing issues on
remand.
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702 n.5 (emphasis added).
122. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42.
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means that a state court can totally sidestep federal review of its
decision.
Some judges and legal commentators have called this an "illegiti-
mate" tactic."' 3 Justice O'Connor in Long left open a number of
loopholes through which federal review could be used; therefore,
mixing state and federal grounds may not be the wisest method to
use when testing Milkovich's limits."' The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has denied certiorari to a case that challenges the use of a
state constitution to give added protection to opinion beyond the
federal limits set forth in Milkovich 25 It would appear that state
constitutional protection, when used carefully, is a way both to give
more protection to opinion than the First Amendment does and to
avoid Supreme Court review - an impressive shield not typically
used in libel cases before Milkovich, when First Amendment law
The principle that we will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate
and independent state grounds is based, in part, on "the limitations of our own juris-
diction." The jurisdictional concern is that we not "render an advisory opinion, and if
the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its view of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."
Id. (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (Simons, J., concurring) (emphasis
added)).
123. See, e.g., Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.) (deciding that the
court should have used only federal grounds because the use of independent state grounds blocks
federal review of a federal question and violates rules of judicial restraint that a court should
decide no more than necessary to resolve a dispute or it is overstepping its proper bounds), cert.
denied, I11 S. Ct. 2261 (1991); Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972) (predicting new importance of state courts due to the Supreme Court's
retrenchment); Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process". Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR.
L. REV. 125 (1970) (reviewing constitutional premises for judicial review of Oregon's regulatory
policies); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985)
(questioning the value of independent state constitutional review based on policy and tradition of
the state and other "noninterpretive" analysis and deciding that the more acceptable "interpre-
tive" analysis is based on language in the state constitution that specifically recognizes rights not
enumerated in the Federal Constitution). But see Judith Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Prac-
tice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399 (1987) (exploring the significance of state constitu-
tional law; Kaye is an Associate Judge for the New York Court of Appeals and wrote the opinion
in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, which used a state constitutional analysis to protect opinion);
Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 431 (1987) (analyzing state constitutional theory; Titone is also a judge on the
New York Court of Appeals and heard the Immuno case); F. Brittan Clayton III, Comment,
Ohio v. Johnson: The Continuing Demise of the Adequate and Independent State Ground Rule,
57 COLO. L. REV. 395 (1986) (tracing the Supreme Court's hostility to the adequate and indepen-
dent state ground rule).
124. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 n.6 ("There may be certain circumstances in which clarifica-
tion [of state law decisions] is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking
the appropriate action.").
125. Inmuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2261
(1991).
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had been favored since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was de-
cided in 1964.126
C. Federal Constitutional Protections for the Press
The Milkovich Court listed several First Amendment protections
available to media defendants and suggested their use in the after-
math of the lost opinion privilege. 2 First, the Court held that state-
ments on matters of public concern are constitutionally protected
from liability under state defamation law, unless they contain "prov-
ably false factual connotation[s] .. . 18 Second, it reasoned that
certain statements, such as "rhetorical hyperbole," cannot reasona-
bly be interpreted as containing factual connotations. 129 Third, the
Court stated that public figures or officials who allege certain state-
ments of "opinion" regarding them reasonably imply false and de-
famatory facts must prove the defendant made the statement with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their
truth."' Fourth, where the statement involves a private figure on a
matter of public concern, the plaintiff must prove the false connota-
tions were made with some level of fault.' 31 Finally, the Milkovich
Court asserted that media defendants are protected by heightened
appellate scrutiny of lower court factual determinations, which it
stated assured that defamation determinations would not "'consti-
tute a forbidden intrusion of the field of free expression.' "1132
1. The Actual Malice Standard of Proof
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'"3 was the watershed case that
first established First Amendment limits on the application of state
defamation law by using its new "actual malice" privilege or de-
fense.'3 4 The New York Times Court recognized the need for fed-
eral law "that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
126. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990) (summarizing fed-
eral protections discussed in detail earlier in the opinion).
128. Id. at 2706.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2706-07.
131. Id. at 2707.
132. Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)).
133. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
134. Id. at 256.
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proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." 13 5
The New York Times Court reasoned that this defense, or "rule"
as the Court called it, 138 was needed to protect critics of public offi-
cials, 1 37 even though some of their statements may be false, in order
to ensure robust and uninhibited public debate on governmental and
other matters of public concern.1 38 This standard protects state-
ments which negligently assert or imply false facts if they do not
reach the "reckless disregard" or "knowledge of falsity" levels of
fault. 319
The Milkovich Court next cited Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,14 0
a 1967 Supreme Court case in which the actual malice rule was
extended to public figures as well as public officials. To be a public
figure, the Butts Court said that one need only be "intimately in-
volved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason
of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large.''
Media defendants should remember, however, that in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,' 42 the Supreme Court refused to extend the ac-
tual malice standard to media defendants when a private person
who was involved in matters of public interest claimed actual or eco-
nomic damages flowing from false and defamatory statements.'4 3
The Court maintained that public officials and public figures have
voluntarily exposed themselves to more public scrutiny and criti-
cism, but that private persons have not similarly volunteered them-
selves.14 4 Applying this rationale, the Court determined that attor-
135. Id. at 279-80.
136. Id. at 279.
137. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing how the actual malice privilege
was later expanded to cases involving public figures as plaintiffs as well as to public officials).
138. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
139. Id. at 288 (stating that the case must be considered "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials").
140. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
141. Id. at 164; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (holding that
absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, or pervasive involvement in
community affairs, an individual should not be deemed a public official for all aspects of his life).
142. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
143. Id. at 347-51.
144. Id. at 344-45.
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ney Gertz was not a public figure, but that he was merely
representing the family of a murder victim in a noncontroversial
civil case related to a controversial murder trial."4 5 The Gertz Court
did retain the actual malice standard as a defense for punitive dam-
ages, however, in order to protect the media from huge awards for
the private plaintiff.1 6 The Supreme Court reasoned that without
the defense, the fear of large and unpredictable awards might un-
necessarily exacerbate media self-censorship. 14 7
In Gertz, the Supreme Court did require some showing of fault by
a media defendant, thus eliminating automatic or strict liability in
cases involving a private plaintiff and a public issue. 48 The Court
wrote that this was a satisfactory balancing of interests; the private
person would be protected in his or her reputation, yet the media
would be shielded from a presumption of liability without proof of
fault. 149
Thus, the actual malice standard does double duty. It protects
speech about public persons by creating such a high standard of
proof that the plaintiff usually cannot meet the burden. 50 It also is
used in certain cases, like Gertz, to make huge damage awards un-
likely. 5' The problem with actual malice, as with the fact/opinion
distinction, is that the analysis methods vary from court to court -
and so do the results. 5 2 As Milkovich itself went up and down the
judicial ladder, initial court analyses deemed the plaintiff a public
figure, but later court analyses declared him a private person.' Ac-
tual malice also needs a bright-line rule or at least better instruc-
tional guidelines from the Supreme Court. 54
145. Id. at 351-52.
146. Id. at 350.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 346-48.
149. Id. at 348.
150. But see Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (up-
holding a jury's finding of actual malice in a newspaper's reporting of allegations against a politi-
cal candidate, where evidence showed the newspaper failed to listen to tape recordings of a conver-
sation that the candidate made available to the newspaper and also failed to contact a major
witness who should have been able to confirm or deny allegations).
151. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
152. For a critical study of the actual malice rule, see HOPKINS, supra note 43.
153. Superintendent Scott, in his separate libel case, was held to be a public figure, while in
Milkovich the plaintiff was held to be a private figure. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110
S. Ct. 2695, 2701 n.5 (1990) ("[R]espondents claim that the determination by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Milkovich v. News-Herald . . . that petitioner is not a public official or figure was over-
ruled in Scott . . . is meritless.").
154. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 76 (suggesting alternative methods of resolving libel
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2. Proof of Falsity - The Plaintiffs Burden
The Supreme Court clarified the multi-faceted Gertz case in Phil-
adelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,'55 where it held "that the com-
mon-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand
when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for
speech of public concern." 156 More importantly, it also held that the
plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity, as well as fault, in
order to recover damages. 57 This allows some false speech to escape
a judgment through lack of proof. It also relieves the media defend-
ant of the burden of proving the truth of its published statements.
3. Rhetorical Hyperbole and Vigorous Epithets
The Supreme Court in Milkovich also reminded media defend-
ants of the "rhetorical hyperbole" defense, which limits the type of
speech that could be libelous.' It cited Greenbelt Cooperative Pub-
lishing Ass'n v. Bresler 59 as supporting the use of this defense. 60
Bresler involved the reporting of heated discussions at Greenbelt,
Maryland city council meetings over a developer's tactics in gaining
zoning variances for use of land he owned in the city.' Two news
articles were published in the Greenbelt News Review which stated
that at the meetings some people had said developer Bresler's nego-
tiating position was "blackmail."182
Bresler sued for libel, claiming that the use of the word blackmail
implied that he had committed the crime of blackmail.1 3 The Su-
preme Court rejected his claim, holding that "as a matter of consti-
tutional law, the word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was not
slander when spoken, and not libel when reported."' 64 The Court
stated that the reports were "accurate and full" and that "even the
most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more
than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who con-
claims that could avoid libel trials altogether).
155. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
156. Id. at 777.
157. Id. at 776.
158. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990).
159. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
160. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704-05.
161. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 7-8.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at 13.
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sidered the developer's negotiating position extremely unreasona-
ble."' 65 It should be noted that in Bresler, the Court found that the
statements in question did not appear to be statements of fact, but
rather words used in a state of high emotion, and were not intended
to be taken literally. 166 The Supreme Court's analysis here is
strongly contextual. Without the use of context, "blackmail" could
have been read as meaning a criminal charge, as "liar" was inter-
preted in Milkovich. It is interesting to note that the word "per-
jury" was never used in Diadiun's column, but was merely
implied. 16 7
The Milkovich Court noted two other Supreme Court decisions
that further refined the "rhetorical hyperbole" defense. In Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,'68 the Court held that the First Amend-
ment precluded recovery under a state emotional distress action for
sexual innuendo in an ad parody which "could not reasonably have
been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure in-
volved."' 6 9 In Letter Carriers v. Austin, °7 0  the Supreme Court
treated the word "traitor," as used in a labor dispute to characterize
strikebreakers, similarly to its treatment of "blackmail" in Bres-
ler.a 7  The Court said it was not defamatory under federal labor
law, but rather was used "in a loose, figurative sense" and was
"merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of
the contempt felt by union members.' 7 2
4. Independent Examination of the "Whole Record"
Finally, the Supreme Court in Milkovich pointed to a further
procedural protection for media defendants in cases raising First
165. Id. at 14. The Court noted that the articles accurately and fully described Bresler's propo-
sal, and that although the article stated some people at the meetings called the proposal black-
mail, it also reported that other people indicated Bresler's position was not unreasonable. Id.
166. Id. at 13-14.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (detailing the allegations in Diadiun column);
see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603, 627-46
(1990).
168. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
169. Id. at 57. The parody involved a sexual play on words of a liquor ad that featured celebri-
ties talking about the "first time" they tasted the liqueur. Hustler Magazine parodied the adver-
tisement, featuring the Reverend Jerry Falwell as the "celebrity," and intimated his "first time"
was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 48.
170. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
171. Id. at 285-86.
172. Id.
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Amendment issues. It cited its previous decision in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union,'7 ' where the Court held that appellate courts
must "'make an independent examination of the whole record' in
order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbid-
den intrusion on the field of free expression.' "17" This enhanced re-
view of the record, beyond that used in other types of appeals, pro-
tects the media from having a judgment decided only on the trial
court's interpretation of the facts.1 7
5
D. The Absolute Opinion Privilege Is Rejected
The Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 171 then
addressed the viability of the Gertz-based absolute privilege for
opinion. It rejected the concept completely: "[W]e do not think this
passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.'177
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his majority opinion in
Milkovich that the "marketplace of ideas" origin of this passage
points strongly to the view that opinions were the sort of thing that
could be corrected by discussion. 78 He added that such an interpre-
tation would not only be contrary to the "tenor and context of the
passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of 'opin-
ion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact."'7 9 The
Milkovich Court did not see the marketplace of ideas today as an
173. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
.174. Id. at 499 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)).
175. Id. at 498-501. Appellate courts normally give deference to the trial court's decision and
accept its findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous," especially if the case has been
lengthy and complicated. This is based on acknowledgment of the trial court's more intimate
knowledge of the details and nuances of the trial proceedings. Id.
176. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
177. Id. at 2705.
178. Id.; see, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohnian Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965) (responding to Meiklejohn's view
of Supreme Court First Amendment decisions); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," Sup. CT. REV. 191 (1964) (analyzing
New York Times v. Sullivan and historical constitutional interpretation); Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is An Absolute, SuP. CT. REV. 245 (1961) (discussing the factionalization
of the Court on First Amendment issues); Post, supra note 167 (defining the domain of public
discourse in light of Hustler v. Falwell); Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First
Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263 (1978) (examining the
First Amendment doctrine in connection with political speech, defamation, and commercial
speech); Shneider, supra note 27, af 65-70 (establishing a model of analysis for opinion).
179. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
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intellectual free-for-all without limits.'80
The Supreme Court cited Judge Friendly in Cianci v. New Times
Publishing Co. as support for this proposition.' Judge Friendly ob-
served that the Gertz dictum "has become the opening salvo in all
arguments for protection from defamation actions on the ground of
opinion, even though the case did not remotely concern the ques-
tion."' 82 The Milkovich Court then stated that the Gertz dictum
was "merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes's classic 'marketplace
of ideas' concept" espoused in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States. "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 83
The Supreme Court in Milkovich did not agree that Justice
Holmes's statement meant that opinions containing defamatory
facts or implications could be corrected by discussion.' 84 The Court
said this would
ignore the fact that expressions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of
objective fact. . . . Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases
his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assess-
ment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of
fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel
these implications; and the statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar," can
cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." '
The key here is that any statement that implies false and defama-
tory facts, no matter what its label, is not protected. Again quoting
Judge Friendly in Cianci, the Supreme Court held that " 'it would
be destructive of the law of libel if a writer would escape liability
for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly
or implicitly, the words "I think" ' " to introduce a statement. 8 6
The Milkovich Court added: "[W]e think the ' "breathing space"'
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2706 (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir.
1980)).
182. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (observing that
Gertz involved allegations that the defendant had a criminal record).
183. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). However, Justice Holmes said, "Of
course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were
uttered here." Id. at 631. This, in itself, acknowledges that he, too, knew there were some limits to
the right to speak freely.
184. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
185. Id. at 2705-06.
186. Id. at 2706 (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir.
1980)).
[Vol. 42:583
FEDERALISM AND LIBEL
which ' "freedoms of expression require in order to survive," ' . . . is
adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the
creation of an artificial dichotomy between '"opinion"' and
fact."18 7
In summary, the Court held that the Bresler-Letter Carriers-
Falwell line of cases provides protection for "statements that cannot
'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an indi-
vidual."' 8 Thus, public debate can include " 'imaginative expres-
sion' " and "'rhetorical hyperbole.' "189 The Court next reasoned
that the New York Times-Butts-Gertz culpability requirements fur-
ther ensure uninhibited public debate by requiring proof of actual
malice for speech about public persons and for punitive damage
awards for private persons involved in public issues. Finally, the
Court observed that the enhanced appellate review allowed by Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union9 ' provides an extra safeguard for free
expression.191
The "dispositive question," the Court said in Milkovich, "be-
comes whether or not a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
the statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that plain-
tiff Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. We think
the question must be answered in the affirmative."' 92 Nine state-
ments and two headlines said that Milkovich lied under oath at the
judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court did not find this to be
"loose, figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the
impression that the writer was seriously maintaining petitioner com-
mitted the crime of perjury," nor did it find that "the general tenor
of the article negated this impression.' 93
The "general tenor" statement clearly indicates that the Supreme
Court was using a contextual basis for part of its analysis, although
it did not articulate this specifically. 9 " But in Milkovich the general
tenor was "liar, liar, liar" throughout and did not use satire or the
emotional outburst of an angered citizenry as in the Bresler-Letter
187. Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)).
188. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
189. Id.
190. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
191. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
192. Id.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78 (outlining the contextual basis analysis).
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Carriers-Falwell line of cases. 195
It would seem that the Milkovich Court could have found colum-
nist Diadiun's "liar" statements equally loose and figurative but for
its connection with testimony Coach Milkovich made under oath at
a judicial proceeding. When statements are made under oath and
the court comes to a decision based on that testimony, it is clearly
unwise for a media defendant to count on court sympathy when the
testimony is disparaged. In addition, records of the two proceedings
could be checked, but Diadiun did not compare them in his column.
Instead, he implied that they would prove that Milkovich committed
perjury.1 96
Implying defamatory facts that can readily be proved true or false
will not be protected as rhetorical hyperbole no matter how emo-
tional the statements may be and no matter where they are located.
Ironically, Diadiun may only have had to state his supporting evi-
dence from the testimony along with his conclusory opinion in order
to save himself, and the media, from the loss of a privilege.
E. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan, dissenting from the holding in Milkovich,197
agreed with the Court's basic holding that the First Amendment
protects opinion sufficiently, even without an absolute opinion privi-
lege. 98 He also stated that the Court's analysis of the Diadiun
statements used
the same indicia that lower courts have been relying on for the past decade
or so to distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion:
the type of language used, the meaning of the statement in context, whether
the statement is verifiable, and the broader social circumstances in which
the statement was made."'
These indicia mirror the Ollman four-factor analysis.200
Where Brennan parted company with the majority was with the
application of these rules. Specifically, he found the statements in
Diadiun's column to be opinion, not fact. He called Diadiun's state-
ment that Milkovich must have lied in court "conjecture" and said
195. See supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text (comparing the language at issue in
Milkovich with the language at issue in Bresler, Letter Carriers, and Falwell).
196. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698 n.2 (setting forth the Diadiun article in its entirety).
197. Id. at 2708-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2708-09.
199. Id. at 2709.
200. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Oilman test in detail).
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that Diadiun was "simply guessing." 01 Justice Brennan stated that
Diadiun clearly indicated the point where factual analysis ended
and open attempts to "surmise" began by his change in word choice
towards the latter part of the article.20 2 Justice Brennan reasoned
that using words such as "seemed," "probably," and "apparently"
negated any impression Diadiun had first-hand knowledge of the
subject matter.20 8
This total divergence in results using the same tests points to the
problem that the Court still has not addressed: There are First
Amendment protections for opinion, but where is the test that can
sort out opinion from fact? If Justice Brennan used the same test
and came up with a different result than did Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and the majority, then what good is such a test?
This is why previous lower courts had gladly adopted the absolute
opinion privilege. This label/context test made it clearer what was
opinion and what was not. Here, in Milkovich, the Supreme Court
said it rejected contextual labels, but it still used an internal context
analysis.2 04
Milkovich does little to clarify the law of libel in regard to the
fact/opinion distinction. The Supreme Court selected an atypically
clear-cut case to analyze this murky area of libel law but gave no
clear instructions on how to apply the opinion protections it enumer-
ated. The media defendant is left with less protection and the likeli-
hood of more litigation now because the lower courts had been more
likely to call a statement opinion while the absolute opinion privilege
still existed. 20 5 There remains no clear test to determine whether
statements published will be considered to be fact or opinion. This
may lead to further self-censorship or to atypical libel law analyses,
such as use of state constitutional grounds for protection of opinion,
to give opinion increased protection beyond the First Amendment
and to avoid federal review.
The media stand on shakier ground than before Milkovich and
must await more specific instructions from the Supreme Court
before their fears are allayed. However, until this occurs, it is in-
formative to see how post-Milkovich courts have tackled the prob-
201. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 27.
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lem and how media defendants have fared.
IV. LOWER COURT DECISIONS AFTER MILKOVICH v. LORAIN
JOURNAL CO.
Despite the loss of the absolute opinion privilege, media defend-
ants have generally won their cases. Because the Supreme Court has
not yet heard a case that would further clarify the fact/opinion
method of analysis, the lower courts are carefully tiptoeing around
the issue.
Lower federal and state court decisions after Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. have used fact/opinion analyses that have ranged from
the sublimely simple to the constitutionally quixotic. Some have
used the First Amendment defenses listed in Milkovich, often bas-
ing them on a context analysis.20 6 The New York Court of Appeals
used federal constitutional grounds to protect factual assertions and,
based on a context analysis, found separate state constitutional
grounds to protect opinion. 0 7
A. Federal Constitutional Protections after Milkovich
One of the first courts to tackle the new fact/opinion analysis af-
ter Milkovich was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney.20 8 The manufacturer of a car-care product sued
television personality Andy Rooney and CBS for libel based on a
statement that Rooney made on the television program 60 Min-
utes. 09 Rooney had been sent a sample of the product by plaintiff
Unelko Corporation, tried it, and said in a broadcast that "[i]t
didn't work.12 10 Rooney claimed the statement was opinion; Unelko
claimed it was a false and defamatory statement.'
Originally, Rooney received a summary judgment in his favor
from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
which held that the statement was constitutionally protected opin-
ion." 2 The appellate court subsequently had to develop a new analy-
206. E.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.
1586 (1991).
207. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 2261
(1991).
208. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 1586 (1991).
209. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 17, 1988, and May 8, 1988).
210. See Unelko Corp., 912 F.2d at 1051.
211. Id. at 1052-53.
212. Id. at 1050.
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sis because Milkovich had been decided before the appeal reached
the Ninth Circuit.213
The court held that Milkovich overruled all previous Ninth Cir-
cuit fact/opinion decisions analyzed under the opinion privilege
standard.214 It then used the Milkovich Court's analysis, ignoring
labels, and decided that "[i]t didn't work" was an objectively verifi-
able statement, not an opinion as the lower court had held.2 15
The Unelko Corp. analysis rejected context as being irrelevant to
the specific challenged statement. It ignored the satirical and hyper-
bolic "tenor" of the broadcast segment as being influential. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[a]lthough part of a humorous report,
the statement 'It didn't work' was presented as fact and understood
as such by several viewers who wrote to CBS." '216 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "[flor these reasons, a fact finder could conclude
that Rooney's statement that Rain-X 'didn't work' implied an asser-
tion of objective fact. 21 7
Despite finding that Rooney's statement did not constitute opin-
ion, the court held that Rooney was not liable for defamation. It
held that the Milkovich-approved Hepps standard of proof21 8 re-
quired that the plaintiff prove the falsity of the statement if there is
a media defendant involved in an issue of public concern. The court
held that Unelko did not meet its burden of proof and affirmed the
district court's summary judgment for Rooney and CBS.2"9
State courts have also continued to use the Olman four-factor
analysis. In Janklow v. Viking Press,220 the South Dakota Supreme
Court, shortly after Milkovich, used a four-factor, Olman-type
opinion analysis to reject a libel claim brought by the governor of
South Dakota against the publishers of a book that made references
213. Milkovich was decided June 21, 1990; Unelko Corp. was decided August 24, 1990.
214. Unelko Corp., 914 F.2d at 1053; cf Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953
F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir.) (holding that Milkovich, although eschewing fact-opinion terminology,
did not change the standard of review in defamation cases), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992);
Moldea v. New York Times Co., 793 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that Milkovich
did not change prior First Amendment law but only rejected a separate constitutional privilege for
statements of "opinion").
215. Unelko Corp., 914 F.2d at 1053-55.
216. Id. at 1054 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 1055.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57 (outlining the Hepps burden of proof
requirements).
219. Unelko Corp., 914 F.2d at 1055-58.
220. 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1990).
1992]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to specific instances of alleged sexual misconduct involving him.22
The court held that under the four-factor analysis, the references
were protected opinion and were not made with actual malice, par-
ticularly since they were directly related to political events and cam-
paigns.222 Thus, the defendant's book was not defamatory and was
protected under the First Amendment. This approach follows
Milkovich.
In a 1990 California case, Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint Union
High School,223 an Ollman context analysis was also used to protect
the defendants' statements as opinion. The suit involved a high
school student newspaper that published an article labeling the
plaintiff as a babbler and the worst teacher at the school, among
other things.224 In applying the four-factor test to label the state-
ments as opinion, a California appellate court stated that this "to-
tality of the circumstances" test was used "before Milkovich" and
that the principles of analysis had not substantially changed after
the Supreme Court's decision.225 This is in line with Justice Bren-
nan's view on the continuing validity of the four-factor test in his
dissent in Milkovich.226
Similarly, an Illinois appellate court, in Flip Side, Inc. v. Chicago
Tribune Co.,227 used a context analysis to conclude that a Dick
Tracy cartoon strip did not contain libelous materials. 22 8 The court
held that the comic strip, which featured escapades involving a rec-
ord company, organized crime, payola, and murders, could not rea-
sonably be understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff
record company. 229 The court stated that the "entire episode," not
just one artistic square, must be considered in a libel action.2 30 It
reasoned that in this context, the statements were "all fanciful ad-
venture," "all classic Dick Tracy" - Bresler-Letter Carriers-
Falwell imaginative speech per Milkovich.2 a'
221. Id. at 417-18.
222. Id. at 422-24.
223. 275 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
224. Id. at 495.
225. Id. at 496-97.
226. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
227. 564 N.E.2d 1244 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
228. Id. at 1253-54.
229. Id. at 1246-50.
230. Id. at 1251.
231. Id. at 1252-54.
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Although the names and nature of the real businesses and those
in the comic strip were basically the same, the court said:
The breathing space that is required for first amendment freedoms .. will
not allow a defamation action to be maintained merely because there is a
similarity of names and business between the plaintiff and the subject in the
publication . . . unless the subject in the publication is reasonably under-
stood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff. 32
The contextual approach is clearly the most popular method of
analyzing fact versus opinion no matter what speech protection is
used as the basis for the defense.
B. The Emergence of State Constitutional Protections after
Milkovich
At the other end of the spectrum was the much-touted 1991 New
York Court of Appeals holding in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankow-
ski.2 33 Some commentators have looked to this case as the media's
best hope for victory after Milkovich.2 a4 The Supreme Court let
stand the New York court's use of state constitutional protection of
opinion as an alternative to use of common law or First Amendment
protections enumerated in Milkovich.235
The libel action in Immuno arose out of a letter to the editor
published in a science journal in December of 1983.236 The letter's
author, an animal rights activist, criticized the research methods
employed by Immuno AG., a biologic products manufacturer.13 7
Specifically, the author alleged that Immuno used noncaptive chim-
panzees, an endangered species, for product experimentation and re-
search .1 8 The letter was published almost a year after its receipt
and more than ten months after the journal had submitted the letter
to Immuno for comment and reply. 3 9 The published letter was pref-
aced by an editor's note explaining Immuno's disapproval and its
232. Id. at 1253.
233. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
234. See, e.g., Spencer, New York Court Looks to State Law on Libel, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 28,
1991, at 16 (noting the chilling effect libel litigation has on free speech); Top N.Y. Court Protects
letters, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 16, 1991, at 27 (stating that Immuno greatly expanded pro-
tection for media defendants in libel suits).
235. Immuno, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
236. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1272.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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referral of the matter to its New York lawyers.240 Immuno subse-
quently sued the editor for libel.24'
The New York Court of Appeals, like the Unelko Corp. court,
was faced with creating a fact/opinion analysis because the lower
court's analysis had been based on the absolute opinion privilege.242
New York's highest court developed a dual analysis based on sepa-
rate federal and state constitutional grounds. The federal ground
used was the Hepps proof-of-falsity approach for factual state-
ments.2 43 The court held that Immuno did not meet the burden of
proof regarding certain stated and implied factual assertions."'
Addressing the letter under state constitutional grounds, the
Court of Appeals used an Ollman-type of contextual analysis and
concluded that the body of the letter conveyed opinions, not facts, to
the average reader.2 4 5 The court reasoned that the state constitution
afforded enhanced protection to the press and speech beyond that
given by the Federal Constitution.246 It said that this was borne out
by case precedents and the tradition of special reverence for free-
dom of expression espoused by residents of the state.247 The court
added that the Federal Constitution fixes only "minimum standards
applicable throughout the Nation," and that state courts may sup-
plement those standards to meet local needs and expectations. 248
The Court of Appeals derived its context analysis from its deci-
sion in Steinhilber v. Alphonse,249 which held that the test for deter-
mining if a statement is opinion or fact is whether the reasonable
reader believes the statements contained defamatory facts about the
plaintiff based on the whole communication, its tone, and its appar-
ent purpose.2 50 Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1273.
242. The New York Court of Appeals had previously dismissed the libel suit on absolute opin-
ion privilege grounds. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1989). The Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Milkovich. 110
S. Ct. 3266 (1990).
243. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1275; see supra text accompanying notes 155-57 (discussing the
Hepps standard).
244. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1275-77.
245. Id. at 1277-82. The Court of Appeals adopted "an analysis that begins by looking at the
content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose." Id. at 1281.
246. Id. at 1278.
247. Id. at 1277-79.
248. Id. at 1277.
249. 501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986).
250. id. at 553.
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that the average reader of the Journal of Medical Primatology
would look upon some of the statements in the letter as an expres-
sion of opinion rather than a statement of fact, even though the lan-
guage was serious and restrained. 5'
The court cited Unelko Corp. as antithetical. "Our state law anal--
ysis of the remainder of the letter . . . would not involve the fine
parsing of its length and breadth that might now be required under
Federal law for speech that is not loose, figurative or hyperbolic. '2 52
The state court sidestepped the Milkovich analysis for opinion and
used a more comprehensive state protection for speech.
The rationale for this carefully constructed state defense is sup-
ported by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long.253 In Long, the
Court held that it would not review state law cases if they were
decided on adequate and independent grounds.254 As long as the
state ground was not related to federal constitutional grounds and
did not depend on federal grounds as precedent, the Court held that
it would not review the decision. 55
The problem with this type of analysis is that the avoidance of
federal review has been termed "illegitimate" by some legal com-
mentators and judges, including Judge Simons in his concurring
opinion in Immuno. 56 Judge Simons concluded that the state
grounds analysis violated the tenets of judicial restraint and was
constitutionally unsound because it denied the Supreme Court,
charged with ultimate authority in the area, a measure of control
over the law it had created.257 In addition, Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion in Long actually tightened the reins on separate state grounds
analysis, rather than loosening them. 58
But for now, the Immuno state law method can insulate its opin-
ion analysis from federal review and provide a safe harbor for media
defendants. Immuno appears to have separated its state grounds
successfully, proving state constitutional protection to be more than
251. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1281.
252. Id. (citations omitted).
253. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
254. Id. at 1038 (citing Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 28 U.S. 765, 773 (1931)).
255. Id.
256. Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1283-86 (Simons, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 1287.
258. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-41 (1983) (holding that if the state law ground rests primarily on
federal law, or is interwoven with federal law, or is unclear on the face of the opinion, the Su-
preme Court will assume that the ground was federal by default).
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just the possibility mentioned in Milkovich.2 59
The post-Milkovich cases generally have favored media defend-
ants despite the loss of the absolute opinion privilege. Courts have
continued to rely on the Olman type of context analysis on which to
base either federal or state constitutional and common law protec-
tions. So far, the cases caught in the middle, those which decided in
favor of media defendants using the opinion privilege prior to
Milkovich and which had to use a different analysis to reach the
same results after Milkovich, have still held for the defendants.
The main problem now and in the future is that it is more likely
that what was once protected opinion will now be deemed to be fac-
tual. The inability of plaintiffs to prove actual malice under New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan"' may remain stable as a protection
when a statement does not pass muster as opinion via rhetorical hy-
perbole26' or fair comment analysis.262 Thus far, there appears to be
no serious change in media libel case results, but there may be more
cases going to trial because challenged statements are held to be
factual. This fear of increased litigation costs alone is enough to
promote a higher level of press self-censorship - or a retreat to
enhanced state constitutional protection and its review-avoiding
advantage.
And the ever-present problem remains - the fact/opinion dis-
tinction is still vague and subjective. Milkovich has not changed the
murkiness in this already troubled area of libel law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. changed
how libel claims are defended by rejecting the sixteen-year-old
Gertz absolute privilege for opinion based on the First Amendment.
It held that there are sufficient protections for opinion in federal
constitutional law and in state common law, and possibly in state
constitutional law. It rejected an opinion "label" as insufficient to
protect challenged statements and held that assertions must be
judged on whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
259. Milkovich,I 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (1990); see supra text accompanying notes 117-26 (dis-
cussing the state constitutional grounds analysis in Milkovich).
260. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
261. See supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text (discussing "rhetorical hyperbole" under
Milkovich).
262. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing "fair comment").
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statements implied factual assertions which could be objectively
verified.
The Milkovich Court listed existing First Amendment protections
for media defendants: the actual malice fault standard; the rhetori-
cal hyperbole or imaginative or loose language standard; placement
of the burden of proof of falsity on the plaintiff; and enhanced ap-
pellate review of the whole record. Milkovich also revived the pre-
Gertz state common law privilege of fair comment for opinion, and
it hinted at the possibility of enhanced press and speech protection
under state constitutional law.
The latter has been called an illegitimate method of avoiding fed-
eral judicial review by some commentators, but it has been tacitly
approved by the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 1991 to
plaintiff Immuno in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski. Supreme
Court review would have tested whether the state court's use of
state constitutional protection was adequate and independent
enough to pass muster under Michigan v. Long. The Supreme Court
apparently believed the test had been met and judicial review was
thus precluded under Long.
Although Milkovich's summarizing of existing protections was
helpful, the Supreme Court failed to explain how to distinguish be-
tween fact and opinion, leaving the courts in the same subjective
position they were in pre-Milkovich. Because the absolute opinion
privilege was the closest thing to a bright-line rule for protecting
opinion, its demise has left members of the media wondering even
more how they can be sure what they publish is protected. This will
likely increase media self-censorship because more statements in-
tended as opinion will be held to be factual and will result in more
libel trials - unless the enhanced state constitutional protection ap-
proach catches on now that it appears viable.
The Ollman four-factor opinion analysis has survived Milkovich
so far, but it is now used to support the other opinion protections
rather than the absolute opinion privilege. This does not, however,
reduce the dangers of media self-censorship because the tests are
subjective.
Milkovich itself is not helpful to the media because it involved a
clear-cut scenario where statements made under oath in official pro-
ceedings were readily verifiable via recorded testimony. Most libel
cases are less clear-cut.
It appears that Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. has stripped
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away a layer of protection for the media and set the scene for the
possibility of more libel trials or for increased self-censorship in
newsrooms nationwide - or both.
For those unwilling to test the waters by publishing robust opin-
ion and counting on fair comment and existing First Amendment
protections to bail out their ship of state(ments), why not try state
constitutional protection? Its benefits are several. Added protection
can be given to opinion beyond that of federal and common law;
Supreme Court review can be avoided if the defense is worded care-
fully, as in Immuno, and it avoids self-censorship and increased libel
suits because the state that taketh away, via libel law, giveth back
with a bonus via state constitutional protections. What does a media
defendant have to lose?
There is an irony here. Yes, Milkovich removed to a slight degree
the federal constitutional protection for opinion. But, like an unwary
gardener, the Supreme Court pulled one weed, the absolute opinion
privilege, and up sprang a hardier one - modern federalism in libel
law.
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